

LITERATURE SUMMARIES

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Work/Study & Independent Study Deliverables

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I. COMPLETE BOOKS

Title: After Hegemony

Author(s): Robert O. Keohane

Publishing Company: Princeton University Press

City: Princeton, NJ

Year: 1984

“After Hegemony” is one of the main works in the liberal institutionalist school of international relations, as well as one of the principal proponents of the “direct channels of influence” theory of IO significance in world politics. In other words, Keohane’s main argument is that -- contrary to popular belief -- international cooperation can persist without the presence of a global hegemon, because international institutions or regimes act as devices that facilitate decentralized cooperation among egoistic capitalist actors.

Title: Designing Social Inquiry

Author(s): Robert O. Keohane, Gary King and Sydney Verba

Publishing Company: Princeton University Press

City: Princeton, NJ

Year: 1996

In this seminal text, Keohane, King and Verba, three scholars from different disciplines, provide detailed guidelines for designing sound research in the field of political science. Interestingly, they argue that, while the styles of qualitative and quantitative research are indeed very different, it is the same underlying logic provides the framework for each research approach, thereby meaning that they are connected on a fundamental logical level. Said logic of inference, moreover, is one which researchers in both trajectories would benefit from giving more attention to when it comes to designing inquiry.

Title: Handbook of Survey Methodology for the Social Sciences

Author(s): Lior Gideon

Publishing Company: Springer-Verlag

City: New York City, NY

Year: 2012

Designed for the non-statistician, this text is an excellent beginner’s guide to the best surveying practices in the social sciences, including political science. Chapters examine the major survey methods of data collection, providing expert guidelines for asking targeted questions, helping students improve the accuracy of their responses and reduce sampling/non-sampling bias. More specifically, the book also contains helpful summary tables of the confidence levels and margins of error for numerous different sample sizes, helping the researcher to choose the most appropriate n and to convincingly justify this choice later on.

Title: Legalization and World Politics

Author(s): Judith L. Goldstein, Miles Kahler, Robert O. Keohane and Anne-Marie Slaughter.

Publishing Company: MIT Press

City: Cambridge, MA

Year: 2001

Why and when do states choose legalized institutional forms when their autonomy would be less constrained by avoiding legalization? How do legalized constraints operate to change government behavior? These are some of the primary questions that Goldstein et al. tackle in “Legalization and World Politics,” uniting perspectives developed by political scientists and international legal scholars in their development of a framework for the study of said topic. More specifically, their overall argument is that the relationship between law and politics is reciprocal, mediated by global institutions in the way explained by the “indirect channels of public opinion” theory.

Title: Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics

Author(s): Beth A. Simmons

Publishing Company: Cambridge University Press

City: New York City, NY

Year: 2009

Much like Goldstein et al.’s book just mentioned, “Mobilizing for Human Rights” constitutes a further example of an indirect, public opinion pathway through which international organizations exert their influence in global politics. In this case, however, Simmons argues that international human rights treaties incite citizens to demand better treatment from their domestic leader(s) and government(s), in turn constraining the latter to provide this if they want to remain in power after the next election.

Title: Securing Approval: Domestic Politics and Multilateral Authorization for War

Author(s): Terrence Chapman

Publishing Company: University of Chicago Press

City: Chicago, IL

Year: 2011

Here, Chapman employs the same methodology as Grieco et al. (2011) – namely, an experimental survey design – by presenting college students with a series of hypothetical situations regarding the American use of force. In each situation, he tells half the sample that the UNSC has voted to allow the US government to use military force, and the other half that the UNSC has voted against taking the proposed military measures. Overall, Chapman recounts how support for military action was “significantly higher” in all these scenarios when the UNSC had voted for the war than when it had voted against it.

Title: The Tragedy of Great Power Politics

Author(s): John J. Mearsheimer

Publishing Company: Norton

City: New York City, NY

Year: 2001

One of the central works in modern IR, this book presents Mearsheimer's famous "offensive realism," which sees the international order as inherently anarchic and denies the existence of a global hierarchy or an inter-state source of authority. Instead, Mearsheimer contends that, in international politics, states are forced to rely only on themselves for security, and therefore seek to expand their power militarily, geographically, and economically to that end. It follows from this that, according to offensive realism, the conflict between great powers will persist for evermore in the global order.

Title: Votes, Vetoes and the Political Economy of Trade Agreements

Author(s): Edward D. Mansfield and Helen Milner

Publishing Company: Princeton University Press

City: Princeton, NJ

Year: 2012

The central question to "Votes, Vetoes and the Political Economy of Trade Agreements" is why a rational national leader would choose to enter a trade agreement that constraints the leader's future ability to set policy. Mansfield and Milner argue that a trade agreement represents an opportunity for the leader to make a visible commitment that voters can monitor, thereby preventing voters from mistakenly blaming the leader's protectionism if the economy performs poorly. In the context of my independent study, then, "Votes, Vetoes and the Political Economy of Trade Agreements" illustrates yet another "indirect pathway of public opinion" through which IOs shape international politics.

II. JOURNAL ARTICLES

Title: Audience Beliefs and International Organization Legitimacy

Author(s): Terrence Chapman

Journal: International Organization - Vol. 63 (4): 733-64.

Year: 2009.

This article investigates the effect of institutional statements on public opinion. Strategic information arguments posit that the effect of institutional statements on public opinion is conditional on public perceptions of member states' interests. Chapman therefore tests this conditional relationship in the context of changes in presidential approval surrounding military disputes, using a measure of preference distance between the United States and veto-wielding members of the UN Security Council. Overall, his findings suggest that the U.S. public will be more swayed by IOs that it perceives as more oppositional to American foreign policy interests, or by UN Security Councils that are more distant in terms of this subject.

Title: Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World

Author(s): Arthur Stein

Journal: International Organization - Vol. 36 (Spring): 299-324

Year: 1982

In his vision of international politics, Stein takes the state as his unit of analysis, and assumes self-interested activity on its part. He is of the view that states are interested in absolute gains, and not the maximization of relative gains. Stein advances a structural conception of state interest, whereby state interests are determined by the distribution of power, as well as the nature of knowledge and of technology and the consortium of domestic state interests. In this sense, Stein envisions a more complex channel of influence for IOs than other scholars, but nonetheless belongs to the "direct channels" school, since his final point is that international institutions develop a legitimacy of their own, and states are loath to exit from institutions because of potential costs to their reputations.

Title: Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games

Author(s): Robert D. Putnam

Journal: International Organization - Vol. 42: 427-690

Year: 1988

"Diplomacy and Domestic Politics" establishes Putnam as one of the pioneers of the 'indirect channels of public opinion' theory. In this article, he challenges the traditional notion of separation between domestic politics and international relations, instead presenting a new 'two-level' approach that emphasizes the entanglements between these two spheres. More specifically, said approach recognizes that central decision-makers strive to reconcile domestic and international imperatives simultaneously, causing statesmen in this predicament to face distinctive strategic opportunities and strategic dilemmas.

Title: International Law and the Use of Force: What Happens in Practice

Author(s): Michael Wood

Journal: The Indian Journal Of International Law - Vol. 53: 345-67

Year: 2013

In this article, Wood argues that, contrary to what many scholars have argued, the existing rules of international law regarding the use of force are adequate to address current national security threats facing states across the world. In particular, Wood highlights the Security Council's powers under Chapter VII of the Charter to authorise the use of force, and the right of self-defence recognised in Article 51 of the Charter, which he sees as "by no means perfect" but nonetheless "preferable to any alternative rules that could be agreed". Efforts radically to amend or reinterpret the rules, he argues, are neither desirable, nor likely to succeed, but there does indeed need to be a greater degree of common understanding, particularly among Governments, as to what these rules actually are.

Title: International Security Institutions, Domestic Politics and Institutional Legitimacy

Author(s): Terrence Chapman

Journal: The Journal of Conflict Resolution - Vol. 31: 134-66

Year: 2007

Chapman develops a formal model which depicts information transmission between a domestic audience, an international institution, and a foreign policy maker. Statements issued by member states through the institution serve to inform the audience about the likely outcomes of its leader's actions. In this way, leaders have incentives to consult relatively conservative institutions, because their support convinces audiences that they should also support proposed policies. Similarly, leaders face incentives to avoid the disapproval of more revisionist institutions, because their opposition will tend to induce public opposition.

Title: Let's Get a Second Opinion: International Institutions and American Public Support for War

Author(s): Joseph Grieco, Christopher Gelpi, Jason Riefler and Peter Feaver

Journal: International Studies Quarterly - Vol. 55 (2): 563-83

Year: 2011

The first work of its kind, this article describes a survey-based experiment that examined support for a hypothetical American intervention in East Timor. In said experiment, half of the respondents were told that "the UN Security Council and our NATO allies" favored the operation, while the rest were told that these two organizations opposed it, enabling inferences of causality between IO endorsements and increased public support for war (in that order). Indeed, the authors found that support for the mission was substantially higher when the UNSC and NATO sided with the president than when they did not. This leads them to conclude that international institutions can affect domestic support for military action by providing a valuable 'second opinion' on the proposed use of force.

Title: The Informational Role of International Institutions and Domestic Politics

Author(s): Songying Fang

Journal: The American Journal of Political Science - Vol. 52: 304-21

Year: 2008

This article presents a game-theoretic model to investigate how international institutions can shape the behavior of democratic leaders by influencing domestic politics. While it seems unsurprising that unbiased leaders who are truly concerned about foreign policy outcomes would consult international institutions, the results show that biased leaders with private agendas can also be forced to behave like the unbiased type because of their electoral concerns. The equilibrium results are illustrated with the cases of U.S. use of force in international crises. Much like Chapman and Reiter's article just described, therefore, Fang's paper constitutes another work in the 'Indirect Channels of Public Opinion' theory that focuses on the subject of foreign military policy and uses macro-level data (specifically looking at former President George W. Bush's decision to invade Iraq in 2003).

Title: The U.N. Security Council and the Rally 'Round-the-Flag Effect

Author(s): Terrence Chapman and Dan Reiter

Journal: The Journal of Conflict Resolution - Vol. 48 (6): 886-909

Year: 2004

This article applies the 'Indirect Channels of Public Opinion' theory to the the subject of military missions abroad. More specifically, this argument asserts that, when it comes to war, all else being equal, the public is more likely to support a proposed military intervention if it has been endorsed by one or more IOs than if it has not. Focusing on the UNSC in particular, Chapman and Reiter contend contend that, when U.S. military action is authorized by a UNSC resolution, Americans will rally more strongly behind the president than when it is not. Using ordinary least squares regression, they analyze data from U.S. military involvement in disputes from 1945 to 2001, finding that the support of UN Security Council significantly increased rallies 'round the president by as much as 8 or 9 percentage points.

Title: Why States Act through Formal International Organizations

Author(s): Kenneth Abbot and Duncan Snidal

Journal: The Journal of Conflict Resolution - Vol. 42 (3): 3-32

Year: 1998

This article addresses the question of why states use formal organizations by investigating the functions IOs perform and the properties that enable them to perform those functions. Starting with a rational-institutionalist perspective that sees IOs as enabling states to achieve their ends, the authors examine power and distributive questions and the role of IOs in creating norms and understanding. Centralization and independence are identified as the key properties of formal organizations, and their importance is illustrated with a wide array of examples. Much like Keohane (1984), this reference is an example of the direct channels of influence theory of IO significance in world politics.

III. UNPUBLISHED TYPESCRIPTS

Title: Burden Sharing, Institutions, and Public Opinion

Author(s): Deborah J. Brooks and Stephen G. Brooks

Institution: Dartmouth University

Year: No date

This paper punctures the conventional wisdom among scholars and pollsters that the American public places a strong positive value on receiving institutional endorsements for military actions. Opposing the orthodox view that it is the ‘brand name’ or reputation of the institutions that Americans value when it comes to military interventions, D. Brooks and S. Brooks find that previous works have conflated institutional endorsements and burden sharing when considering public support for war. To support their theory, they use an experiment with a large-N, geographically representative sample of U.S. adults, in which they simultaneously vary both the degree of institutional endorsement and the presence or absence of material support from other states. All in all, their findings are striking: while burden sharing does significantly increase public approval for war, it is the “material contribution of other states” that the American people value, and not the “institutional backing” itself. This last finding is particularly important because, methodologically speaking, it is the most sound among the existing works in this line of research, and yet it challenges the reigning paradigm that these put forward.

Title: How Does the U.N. Security Council Influence Public Opinion?

Author(s): Dustin Tingley and Michael Tomz

Institution: Harvard University

Year: 2012

Making an important advancement from the previous literature, Tingley and Tomz go beyond determining whether the UNSC affects public opinion, instead testing how (i.e. the variety of mechanisms through which) it might do so. More specifically, they identify three reasons why a UNSC resolution that authorizes military action could influence public opinion: people might view the resolution as a signal that military force is warranted; as an indication that other nations will foot part of the military bill; or as a public promise that they feel an obligation to uphold. At the end of their experiment, they conclude that the “signal-of merit theory,” which Grieco et al. (2011) and Chapman (2011) defend, received surprisingly little support in their data. Meanwhile, the burden sharing theory was consistent with some aspects of the data, but ultimately failed several crucial tests, leaving public commitment theory as the one which accorded most closely with their data. In short, their final conclusion is that UNSC authorizations signal collective commitments, which citizens want to fulfill independent of any beliefs about the cost of the mission and the likelihood of success.
